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We each are presented with a choice; do we remain in the cave of ignorance or embark on the 
philosopher’s journey.  Your choice will determine the way in which you interpret this paper. 
However, I will confidently make the assumption that you, like myself, desire to embrace an 
existence guided by the light of wisdom. This thesis is one of many chapters in the philosopher’s 
journey, dealing with animals and (cutting through the jargon) kindness. I have found that a lot 
of scholarship on animal ethics acknowledges a truth, but does not acknowledge that the 
application of such a truth is pragmatic and dependent on an individual’s circumstances in life. 
This thesis is an attempt to dispel shadows and guide one outside the cave in a pragmatic 
manner. This journey is not siloed or an immediate sprint toward wisdom. Each step in the 
direction of truth will guide us toward the exit of the cave. There is a reason the philosopher’s 
journey is lifelong; the radiance of wisdom may blind us if we do not exam our surroundings and 
then eventually face the sun. This paper will guide us up the stairs by challenging speciest lines 
of reasoning, acknowledging a failing of moral duty, ushering in non-human animals as moral 
patients within the moral community, and providing an examination of a possible intervention 




Animal Ethics, Animal Rights, Animal Welfare, Animal-Human Framing, Kindness,           
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Section I - Introduction 
Part I: The Extension of Compassion  
The philosopher’s journey is the essence of life; to love (philo) wisdom (sophos).  
I use the word life intentionally above humanity as the philosopher’s journey is not in a silo; 
awakening from ignorance is an inclusive process inspired by all inhabitants of the natural world. 
With human capacity comes a battle between ultimate reality and the material world. It can be 
argued that plant life and non-human animals are by default closest to wisdom as their capacities 
are most present within reality and are not subject to the pleasures of the 21st century material 
world, disconnecting us from wisdom and plugging us into ignorance. To quote Zen Master 
Shunryu Suzuki, “In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities, but in the expert’s, there 
are few” (Suzuki, 1). To remain in ignorance is to hold the belief that humanity is an expert on 
the philosopher’s journey.  
Human beings occupy many roles that result in the pursuit of wisdom. What may be 
intuitive to other beings comes with great effort to humanity. One of many simple examples is 
remaining focused on one task. With metacognition comes the de facto ability to hold several 
thoughts in mind, many of which are false realities found within a nonexistent future. For non-
human animals, such a task comes easier as their capacities are constructed to have intentions 
remain in the present moment. Just as the non-human animal’s existence can inspire such 
wisdom as present focus, humanity has the capacity to pursue moral reflection championing 
justice for those most vulnerable in our society. However, such an ability is a challenge to 
mobilize as both the academic philosophical community and humanity in general are caught 
within the ignorance of semantics that labels and divides beings leading to prejudice. It is my 
belief that if you play a role in the philosopher’s journey, you are deserving of just treatment. 
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However, this belief is an ideal that may take centuries to advance in its entirety. As such, I will 
advance a thesis to extend the moral community to non-human animals and bring to light the 
moral impermissibility of the prejudice of speciesism or the discrimination based on mere 
species membership. It is my hope that ideals of today will become realities of tomorrow that 
advance kindness, compassion, and wisdom. 
 
Part II: Structure of Paper 
To advance a thesis to extend the moral community to non-human animals while bringing to 
light the moral impermissibility of speciesism is not a task I take lightly. There are several 
dimensions that must be addressed to support such claims. Even though it is not as in depth as a 
doctoral thesis, my paper is structured to acknowledge a problem and test a possible solution to 
said problem. This will be done through two additional sections: Section II: Speciesism as a 
Neglect of Moral Duty; Section III: Impact of Framing Intervention Model on Animal Attitudes, 
Animal Rights, and Human Social Outgroups. The first section will examine the issue at hand 
through a philosophical lens providing arguments opposing my thesis, which will in turn be 
responded to by drawing on key scholarship in animal ethics. The second section will consist of 
a psychological research study I performed in order to determine the legitimacy of an 
intervention model that may have the potential to reduce speciest mindsets if employed at the 
right stage of adolescence. Through my interdisciplinary scholarship I will provide a path for 
non-human animals to enter the moral community, demonstrate how speciesism is morally 
impermissible, and test the efficiency of an intervention model that may have the potential to 
reduce speciest attitudes toward non-human animals.   
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Part III: Section II-Speciesism as a Neglect of Moral Duty 
In Section II, I will examine and respond to two philosophers and their scholarship that opposes 
my thesis. They are as follows: (1) Carl Cohen in his Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical 
Research and (2) Christine Korsgaard in her work Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our 
Duties to Animals. Both philosophers deny non-human animals the opportunity to be among the 
moral community by labeling them as an obligation. As an obligation, human beings do not have 
a moral duty to protect them, but rather to treat non-human animals to the extent to which they 
will not prevent human beings from fulfilling their own duties toward other humans. For 
instance, as an obligation non-human animals can be subject to medical experimentation by 
doctors as doctors have a duty to treat their patients. Whether this research is cruel to non-human 
animals is irrelevant as they are not a part of the moral community and thus are not a primary 
moral concern.  
To provide background which will be examined further within Section II; the moral 
community consists of moral agents, those that can employ moral reflection and have a moral 
duty toward moral patients, or those that are unable to rely on metacognition when presented 
with a moral dilemma (e.g. mentally disabled, elderly, or children). However, as members of the 
moral community, patients are subjects of moral concern and consideration, and we should 
prevent their abuse and unjust suffering. I will argue in Section II that non-human animals should 
be among the individuals we consider moral patients as they too cannot employ metacognition to 
morally reflect and are thus not held morally accountable for actions. Thus, we would be 
providing them with the protections awarded to human patients. Namely, moral agents would 
provide protection for non-human animals by defending them from exploitation and needless 
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suffering. However, as we will discuss, both Cohen and Korsgaard deny animals the rationality 
that is awarded to human moral patients or rather the “potential” for moral reflection. Cohen 
explicitly adopts the position that this capacity only exists in humankind while Korsgaard argues 
that under the Kantian sense of autonomy human beings have a level of rationality not awarded 
to non-human animals, thus denying them a relevant moral status.  
I will argue against such claims in order to establish non-human animals as beings who 
deserve membership in the moral community.  I will respond to Cohen and Korsgaard by using 
the scholarship of the following two animal ethicists: (1) Peter Singer in Animal Liberation: The 
Definitive Classic of The Animal Movement and (2) Tom Regan in his work The Case for Animal 
Rights. I will utilize the works of Singer to address Cohen’s dependence on human potentiality of 
capacity rather than actual mental capacity. This can be illustrated such that a four-year-old pig 
has an equal if not greater mental capacity to that of a baby, but is denied moral status as he is 
not human and does not have the potential for greater moral reflection. However, it is an 
assumption, in this brief example, to rely on the possibility of moral reflection developing when 
it may never. Therefore, to be considered a moral patient, individuals must be evaluated based on 
present capacities.  
To a certain extent this is done with the elderly who may have once been moral agents, 
but become moral patients as mental capacities diminish with older age. To not apply the same 
principle to animals is speciest; an act of prejudice because non-human animals are denied moral 
relevance based merely on species membership. Once addressing Cohen and providing an 
explication of Korsgaard I will argue against her denial of rationality of non-human animals. 
Through Regan’s notion of preference autonomy, non-human animals will be given a level of 
rationality which provides them with the inherent right to moral patienthood. An example of 
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preference autonomy may be your household pet’s decision to not eat when hungry because it 
prefers treats. Once non-human animals are recognized as moral patients, metacognitive human 
beings or moral agents will have a direct moral duty to non-human animals, protecting them 
from undue suffering and exploitation. This duty will acknowledge their moral worth and thus 
further show speciesism as morally impermissible, a prejudice that results in a denial of a moral 
agent’s duty to non-human animals and the wider moral community based merely on species 
membership. This paper’s central objective is to elevate a non-human animal’s position from 
being a mere obligation to the morally relevant status of patienthood, awarding them a place 
within the moral community. However, once a moral patient, further research will need to be 
done in order to reinforce and define the role of moral patienthood among human and non-
human animals, allowing each member to thrive within the moral community.  
 
Part IV: Section III- Impact of Framing Intervention Model on Animal Attitudes, Animal  
Rights, and Human Social Outgroups  
 
In Section III, after having established the moral status of non-human animals, I will transition to 
the examination of speciesism as a prejudice and test a possible solution to increase moral 
attribution and sense-related capacities awarded to non-human animals. Such an intervention 
may reduce speciest attitudes amongst human beings. In their recent study, When Closing the 
Human-Animal Divide Expands Moral Concern: The Importance of Framing, Brock Bastian, 
Kimberly Costello, Steve Loughnan, and Gordon Hodson concluded that a particular framing 
model “animals-are-human-like” increases moral concern for both non-human animals and 
human outgroups. However, the sample size of the study was small, calling into question if the 
effect of “animal-human” framing would stay consistent with a larger sample size. The effect, 
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even though existent, may be too small to be a viable means to reduce bias among non-human 
animals and human outgroups.  
Therefore, Dr. Curtis Phills of the University of North Florida and I have replicated the 
study (Bastian et al.) to determine if the effect of “animal-human” framing can be a reliable 
intervention model. For instance, in the study Attitudes Toward Animals: Age-Related 
Development Among Children by Stephen R. Kellert, it is explained that eleventh graders’ 
attitude toward animals is most moralistic compared to every grade prior. A moralistic attitude is 
defined as a “primary concern for the right and wrong treatment of animals, with strong 
opposition to exploitation or cruelty toward animals” (Kellert 48). During such a stage in 
adolescence an intervention model such as animal to human framing, may be a viable way to 
reduce speciest attitudes early on, habituating an ethical concern for animals that by default will 
allow rising moral agents to fulfill his or her duty to the moral community. This duty being not 
causing non-human animals needless suffering.  
 
Part V: Framing the Discussion 
The intention of this thesis or conversation is to approach animal ethics and the philosopher’s 
journey in what I would like to classify as a “safe space”. I am not shaming those who are not 
vegan (I am pescatarian myself due to medical reasons) or using this as an opportunity to stir the 
pot of resentment and stereotypes. At the root of my defense, is my goal to foster civil discourse 
in a way that is void of the ignorance brought upon by judgements or preconceived notions of 
another’s experience. If the readers are to take anything away from my scholarship it is to extend 
kindness to all life sentient and non-sentient. Our existence is one that is driven by compassion 
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and collaboration if we let go of our egos and take a moment to suspend judgement and actively 
listen. I look forward to being one of many inspirations along the philosopher’s journey. 
 
Section II – Speciesism as a Neglect of Moral Duty 
Part I: Introduction 
Join me as we return to every philosopher’s origin: Plato’s cave. You are the protagonist, 
chained by your neck and ankles to a cold damp rock wall. Directly across from you is another 
wall where there are two figures moving and speaking; you have known them since birth, and 
they are a consistent and important part of your existence. However, one day a third figure 
appears and suddenly unshackles your chains. As you fall to the ground, you are paralyzed with 
fear and bewilderment. The third figure helps you up, dusts you off, and says, “We need to talk.” 
Even though you are now unchained, you have always enjoyed having discussions with the 
figures in the room, so you agree to listen. The third figure explains that the figures you have 
been talking with are shadows projected through a hole in the wall above your head; a reflection 
of a fire and two physical figures who are in a room above your own are projected onto the wall 
across from you. The third figure continues, “I have returned from a land above where there is 
only brightness; the shadows of the cave have blinded you. Will you join me in the ascent to 
regain your vision?” You respond, “Why should I believe these outrageous claims coming from 
a figure I have not seen until today? You must be a deceiver, for the truth is right before my eyes, 
plain as day.” The third figure responds, “My dear friend, you are the one that must decide what 
to believe, but I encourage you to join me, as I was a prisoner shackled here so many years ago 
beside you.” 
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If you are continuing to read, just as I continue to write, we have both made the decision 
to follow the third figure. Just as the prisoner of the cave became accustomed to viewing 
shadows as truth, as children we are raised on beliefs that serve as a foundation for our 
worldview. Such foundational beliefs can chain us to Plato’s cave because challenging personal 
beliefs or societal norms calls into question who we are and ultimately the individual we choose 
to become in the world. By questioning the shadows in front of us we are given the gift of 
philosophia or the love of wisdom. By pursuing wisdom, we are met with its counter parts such 
as justice, truth, knowledge, and all subsequent derivatives that come from exiting the cave into 
the world where the sun shines brightly.  
 
Part II: Byproducts of Leaving the Cave - Animal Welfare and Animal Rights 
Two former prisoners that have made the ascent outside the cave, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, 
each have endorsed a distinct philosophy that serves as a guide toward wisdom or the world 
outside the ignorance of the cave. By challenging our assumptions about the current societal 
treatment of non-human animals we each can recognize the “shadows” that distract us from the 
pursuit of wisdom each day. The first, adopted by Peter Singer, is Animal Welfare and the 
second, advanced by Tom Regan, is Animal Rights. Even though each philosophers school of 
thought differs in certain aspects each view advocates for the moral treatment of non-human 
animals and positions speciesism, or discrimination based on mere species resulting in unfair 
treatment, as immoral. Speciesism is pervasive within society, but is disguised through practices 
that have gone unquestioned until recently. Examples of practices that are defined as speciest in 
nature include animal scientific experimentation, fur farms, factory farming, and other daily 
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practice that many, including myself, are not prompted to question until we are provided with a 
road map to leave the cave.  
Such a map begins with Animal Welfare, a school of thought originating from Jeremy 
Bentham’s philosophy of utilitarianism or, “each to count for one and none for more than one” 
(Singer, 5). Animal Welfare extends a basic principal of equality to all beings that can feel 
pleasure and pain or suffer (2). However, the principal of equality does not require equal 
treatment, rather equal consideration for all humans and non-humans who can feel pains and 
pleasures (2). For instance, even though an individual may slap a horse on the rump it may feel 
little pain as its skin is thick; however, if we were to slap a baby with the same force it will cry 
and feel pain as its skin is sensitive (15). In this instance, it would be worse to slap a baby than a 
horse, however, if we were to slap a horse with a large stick with enough force to be equivalent 
in pain to slapping a baby this would be wrong (15). To inflict an equal amount of pain, but label 
one as morally permissible solely based on mere species affiliation goes against the principle of 
equal consideration and is immoral (15).  
Therefore, equal consideration lends itself to produce different treatment and rights (2). 
This is exemplified through laws permitting human fights like UFC while other laws penalize 
dog fighting. However, our laws also penalize the use of human test subjects, while permitting 
and rewarding the deaths of animals in scientific research. The principal of equal consideration is 
upheld in some cases, but denied in others. In the Animal Welfare view to deny a non-human 
animal this equal consideration is a form of speciesism or “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor 
of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species” 
(Singer, 6). Another way of putting this is that speciests allow the interests of their own species 
to override the greater interests of others based on mere species membership (9).  This holds true 
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to other forms of prejudice such as those who are racist and give greater weight to interests of 
members of their own race when their interests are in conflict with the interests of another’s race, 
simply due to their race (9). The same applies to sexism where men may only favor the interests 
of other men over women, simply due to their sex (9). Humans being raised to be world class 
fighters that engage in brutal violence should be evaluated under the principle of equality as 
different, therefore laws are put into place to advance this equal consideration; however, when it 
comes to other species such as animals commonly used in biomedical research (rats, rabbits etc.) 
speciesism draws the line, denying a being who can suffer and feel pleasure equal consideration 
to that of other species.  
A second motivation for the moral treatment of animals is the Animal Rights view 
endorsed by Tom Regan, holding the position that moral rights are universal and individuals 
cannot deny others moral rights (Regan, 267). This is because of the respect principle for 
inherent value or the ability for those with inherent value to have a claim to respectful treatment 
(277-278). According to Regan inherent value is the view of an individual having value in 
themselves. No external features should deny this moral equality (235). Those with inherent 
value are subjects of life: 
they are able to perceive and remember; if they have beliefs, desires, and preferences; if 
they are able to act intentionally in pursuit of their desires and goals; if they are sentient 
and have an emotional life; if they have a psychophysical identity overtime; and if they 
have an individual experiential welfare that is logically independent of their utility for, 
and interest of others. (264)  
 
An example of an animal possessing Regan’s inherent value would be a dog or pig. Each can 
remember the face of their owners, have preferences such as deciding to play outside when 
hungry, both have emotional love for their owners (multiple examples found on YouTube or 
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social media), and each in Regan’s view have worth outside the interest of others or in the case 
of both dogs and pigs, worth outside human consumption.  
Therefore, all beings with this level of sentience possess inherent value and therefore are 
morally entitled to fair treatment. When vulnerable members of our society are exploited, like the 
elderly, mentally disabled, children, or non-human animals, we are faced with a moral decision, 
or the decision to act or ignore. There are laws in place to promote action that protects such 
vulnerable population of humans, however, millions of non-human animals are exploited every 
day in research labs or factory farms due to their mere species membership. Such moral 
separation occurs when speciest attitudes are acted upon unbeknownst to most people in our 
daily lives including myself. By leaving the cave we can gain an alternative perspective that, 
when applied to our own lives, can expand our moral outlook of the world and its inhabitants’ 
human and non-human alike. This paper is an attempt for us both to take a moment to question a 
foundational belief we all were raised to leave unchallenged, namely the treatment of non-human 
animals within our society.  
 
Part III: Discussion Summary 
In my paper, I will examine two challenges to the schools of thought presented by Peter Singer 
and Tom Regan. I will provide an explication of the first challenger, Carl Cohen in his Case for 
the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research, in which he challenges objections raised by animal 
welfare advocates (those who believe that non-human animal suffering should not count less 
than human suffering simply because it is experienced by a different species) and animal rights 
advocates (those that believe animals have inherent rights as living sentient beings). He believes 
the philosophic outlook of animal welfare advocates is mistaken in their calculation of 
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consequences while the animal rights advocates argue with a misunderstanding of the properties 
of a right. Once addressing Cohen’s argument, I will begin to argue against Cohen’s speciest 
premise or his denial of moral patient status to non-human animals solely based on an 
individual’s mere species membership, appealing to human potentiality rather than actual mental 
capacity. Through Peter Singer’s scholarship, I will address Cohen’s misconception of utilitarian 
calculus and establish that animal experimentation would not lead to a higher net gain but rather 
may result in a net loss under the hedonic calculus model.  
  Transitioning to the second challenger, philosopher Christine Korsgaard, I will provide 
an explication of her work Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals. 
Korsgaard’s thesis argues that non-human animals are not rational beings and thus are not 
awarded a moral status that allows them to be an end in themselves and a duty to moral agents or 
those that have the capacity to employ moral reflection and who have a duty toward moral 
patients. Namely, the duty to acknowledge them as members of the moral community and protect 
them from exploitation that would imply they are not worthy of moral concern. For instance, 
agents would have a duty to protect non-human animals from cruel experimentation that 
promotes the exploitation of non-human animals, as well as denies them moral consideration.     
I will respond to Korsgaard by appealing to Tom Regan’s notion of preference autonomy, 
establishing a level of rationality for non-human animals that can provide them with a moral 
status equal to that of a moral patient, or those who are objects worthy of moral concern even 
though they lack mental capacities that moral agents possess. Once established as inherent moral 
patients, I will again appeal to Tom Regan’s recognition that human moral agents have a duty to 
prevent the unnecessary suffering of moral patients inflicted by human beings. To not do so 
would be to neglect a moral agent’s duty thus resulting in immoral action. This immoral action I 
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will denote as speciesist or discrimination based on a sentient being’s mere species membership. 
Such discrimination calls into question both Cohen’s and Korsgaard’s claims, giving us reason to 
reject their cases against both Animal Welfare and Animal Rights respectively.  
 
Part IV: Addressing Carl Cohen’s Challenge 
Carl Cohen disputes arguments against the use of animals in biomedical research. Cohen 
attempts to dismantle both animal rights and animal welfare views that oppose such research. 
Cohen’s objections are based on the following: (1) a misunderstanding of a right and (2) a 
reliance on a mistaken calculation of consequences (Cohen, 865). Beginning with rights activists 
he addresses why animals have no rights. A right, according to Cohen, is a claim or potential 
claim one party exercises over another (865). The content of the claim can vary, as can the right 
holder: namely, the holder can be a single entity, such as an individual using “the fifth” in order 
to not self-incriminate in front of a police officer, or a community, such as students walking out 
of class to advocate for gun-reform. In these two instances, to comprehend rights fully, we must 
know who holds the right (accused persons, students), against whom it is held (police officer, 
government officials), and to what it is a right (right to not self-incriminate, right to freedom of 
speech) (865). Cohen goes on to argue that rights are claims or potential claims that are within a 
specific type of community: that of human moral agents and patients. Rights only arise and are 
possessed by beings who make moral claims against one another, according to Cohen, and this is 
only a capacity of human beings (865).      
To bolster his claim Cohen turns to Kant who emphasizes humanity’s possession of a 
moral will (or one’s ability to confront moral choices and establish moral laws for themselves 
and others) (866). This awards human beings with the autonomy to make decisions when 
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confronted with moral laws or to self-legislate (866). Cohen claims that non-human animals lack 
the capacity for self-legislation or free moral judgement, therefore excluding them from the 
capacity to hold rights (866). Unlike non-human animals, human beings are able to recognize 
possible conflicts between their interests and decide what is just (866). According to Cohen, a 
being that is simply alive cannot derive rights from life in and of itself, as an animated being 
must possess the ability to assert free moral judgement (866). Therefore, humans are the only 
possessors of rights.  
However, humanity is not morally free to abuse this higher moral status; in fact, Cohen 
believes we have obligations to animals. This is because those who possess rights also have 
obligations (866). According to Cohen, rights and obligations are not reciprocals; this is because 
obligations arise from internal commitments made (866). This can manifest in the form of a 
special relationship (a mother has the obligation to feed her son) or a difference in status (a boss 
has the obligation to pay his or her employee) (866). Obligation towards non-human animals is 
presented as doing no gratuitous harm to sentient creatures (non-maleficence) and/or to do good 
toward a non-human animal if in one’s power (beneficence) (866). However, the distinction 
Cohen makes here is that treating non-human animals humanely does not equate to treating them 
as beings who possesses rights and are subject to moral concern (866).  To clarify, unlike Regan 
and Singer, Cohen’s view of “humanely” permits animal suffering based on mere species 
discrimination (animal experimentation, factory farming, etc.) so long as it does not impede on a 
human’s moral duty to other human beings.  
Cohen addresses two objections to his present claim: (1) humans lacking the capacity for 
self-legislation, but still have rights, justifies the notion that rights exist without the presence of 
moral capacities. (2) These capacities, though Cohen awards them exclusively to non-human 
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animals, do not actually distinguish humans from other animals because animals reason (exhibit 
desires and preferences) and display features of moral relevance (rationality, interdependence, 
and love) (866). He responds to the first objection by explaining that the capacity for moral 
judgement is an essential feature of humanity (867). It is irrelevant whether someone is 
cognitively able to act on these capacities as it is inherent within human kind and as humans we 
possess such latent or active capacities (867). Persons unable to perform to the full moral 
function natural to humans are not ejected from their moral community (867). For instance, 
humankind can be subjected to experimentation only if they give consent, while animals are 
unable to do so because they are not of the kind that could ever have this capacity to consent.  
Cohen addresses the second objection by stating that patterns of conduct do not allow 
animals to exist as a member in a community of moral agents. Actors in such a community are 
capable of moral judgement or grasping the “generality of an ethical premise in a practical 
syllogism” (867). According to Cohen, humans unlike non-human animals, are inherently 
equipped with the capacity to be able to discern by applying a moral rule to the facts of a case. 
Non-human animals are unable to be morally autonomous in this way, such as a wolf not being 
faced with discerning the rights of potential prey. Non-human animals are unable to grasp the 
internal and external dimensions of moral action and thus are not members of a self-legislating 
moral community; therefore, Cohen claims that animal rights arguments against biomedical 
research on animals rely on a false premise about the meaning of ‘inherent value’ (867). The 
issue for Cohen, as he puts it, is rooted in the notion of ‘kind’ (867). Unlike animal rights 
activists, Cohen believes inherent value (in the relevant sense) is an essential feature to humanity 
that non-human animals never have nor will possess (866). For instance, a wolf can neither be 
prosecuted for killing a baby rabbit or question the moral implications of killing a human infant. 
  16 
 
In Cohen’s view this moral rationality serves as the inherent value placed on humankind. A non-
human animal cannot be obligated by or obligated to a moral action.  
Transitioning to Animal Welfare claims against biomedical research on animals, Cohen 
argues against the welfare activists, who argue against his premise on the grounds of an animal’s 
sentience or capacity to feel pain (867). According to Cohen, stating that non-human animal 
experimentation is wrong because of the net pain or absence of pleasure to the animal does not 
serve as an effective justification (867). Cohen argues that animal welfare advocates commit two 
errors: (1) a misconception that all sentient beings have equal moral standing and (2) assuming 
that the utilitarian calculus would not be in favor of animal research (867). He responds first to 
the claim that speciesism is parallel to racism in the way that it is wrong to give unjust moral 
preference to one species based merely on species membership or race over another (867). He 
states that unlike racists who do grave moral wrong because there is no morally relevant 
distinction among races, a speciest recognizes the morally relevant difference between a human 
and non-human animal as they are not on equal moral standing (867). The ability to distinguish 
this difference promotes the right conduct necessary to recognize an individual’s moral 
obligations (867). According to Cohen if the pains of a human and non-human animal count 
equally, then our society must conclude that rodents and humans possess all the rights that 
humans possess (867). 
According to Cohen, the moral regard humans owe other humans is not the same as what 
humans morally owe non-human animals (867). For instance, a human obligation may be that a 
doctor needs to heal her patient, as a principle duty as one who possesses rights; the fulfilment of 
this obligation may require the sacrifice of animals (868). Therefore, a doctor who does not 
research on animals as a biomedical investigator would fail to do his or her duty if the research 
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would support the healing of a patient. Cohen’s response to the second error addresses the extent 
to which biomedical research must weigh the benefits of research. He claims that unlike animal 
rights activists who can ignore the benefit of research (as it would violate an animal’s inherent 
right), the animal welfare advocate must acknowledge the pleasures that are derived from using 
animals in research (as they believe all pain and pleasure are morally considerable) (868). 
According to Cohen the elimination of disease, increased longevity, and the avoidance of pain 
that comes about as a result of animal experimentation has improved the lives of both humans 
and non-human animals, fixing the hedonic calculus in support of the long-term results of 
biomedical research (868).  
Cohen’s reliance on capacities stems from the deontological belief in a legislative will. 
Through a speciest lens, this Kantian principle excludes non-human animals from being 
members of the moral community and instead views them as obligations. This obligation extends 
as far as it does not encroach on the duty of human beings, namely treating others with just and 
fair treatment. If a human killed every non-human animal he or she saw on the street this 
repeated action may one day translate to human beings. To mistreat animals intentionally for no 
benefit to humankind can demonstrate the potential to harm humans within the moral community 
that may be vulnerable, such as elderly, children, or other moral patients. On the reverse side, 
this obligation permits acts such as animal experimentation as the benefits to humanity are part 
of a moral agent’s duty. By testing on animals those with a legislative will can advance the 
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Part V: Response to Cohen’s Challenge 
According to Cohen’s logic, rights of non-human animals do not depend on the presence 
of moral capacities, but of their mere species. In this instance, a non-human animal is 
underserving of rights as their capacity, according to Cohen, is not performing at a full moral 
function natural to human moral agents. I am in agreement with him when he wants to extend the 
moral community to accept human moral patients, as would be Regan. However, when he 
excludes non-human animals from the moral community by labeling them obligations he is 
appealing to the prejudice of speciesism. Based on Cohen’s views he would endorse the claim 
that humans can be subjected to experimentation as they have the innate capacity to give consent, 
while non-human animals are an obligation that can be experimented on as they do not have this 
innate capacity. This, however, is flawed, as those humans who we consider moral patients such 
as infants do not yet have the innate ability to give consent themselves. In this instance, it is not a 
capacity that has developed or may ever develop; awarding a capacity on the foundation of 
human potentiality is immoral. If there are two individuals one who will never have the capacity 
of moral reflection and one who lacks the mental ability to enact meta-cognition they are both 
unable to perform an action necessary to be considered a moral agent. Therefore, distinguishing 
the two solely based on mere species or perceived inherent capacities is morally impermissible.  
A child may transition from infancy to adulthood, but this does not change the fact that a 
young child cannot consent to practices such as experimentation. In fact, children as moral 
patients require an adult to give that consent. A child gets their ability to consent from their 
parents, who are moral agents. This is an example of a moral agent fulfilling his or her duty to a 
moral patient, defending the patient’s right to not suffer in the moral community. For instance, a 
mother would not consent to their child being tortured to find the cure for the common cold. The 
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same framework must be awarded to non-human animals. Non-human animals deserve the right 
to respectful treatment just like human moral patients, from which humans of agency have a duty 
to provide. Just as the child’s consent is defended by their moral agent parents we as a species 
have a moral duty to defend non-human animals who, just as children, cannot provide consent to 
abusive experimentation. A human child and a non-human animal are both worthy of moral 
patient status as each play a role as a member of the moral community. To exclude non-human 
animals is appealing to speciesism, which does not amount to sound argumentation.  
When considering experimenting on animals for biological research, the animal rights 
advocate, as seen above, would be against such practices as it violates the rights owed to a moral 
patient. The same conclusion is reached from an animal welfare perspective. Cohen’s claim that 
there is a misconception that all sentient beings have equal moral standing is a misconstrued 
interpretation of an animal welfare’s defense of non-human animals. According to Cohen if the 
pain of a human and non-human animal count equally, then this leads to the seemingly false 
conclusion that both are deserving of equal rights. As established above, being a moral patient or 
a moral agent awards the right to respectful treatment; however, a patient does not have the 
ability to give consent like an agent does. What Cohen fails to see is this: “The basic principle of 
equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration. Equal 
consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights” (Singer, 
2). 
Just as Regan established the rights of moral patients by appealing to the similarity of 
suffering (Regan, 183), Singer emphasizes that “[n]o matter what the nature of the being, the 
principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering-insofar 
as rough comparisons can be made-of any other being” (Singer, 8). As Regan suggests, 
  20 
 
recognizing the similar unjust pain or suffering endured by a human moral patient causes a moral 
agent to act from duty (Regan, 183) and expanded upon by Singer, this “comparison of 
suffering” promotes agents to act and protect non-human animals, thus is reason to 
disenfranchise animal scientific research (Singer, 8). Contrary to popular belief, research on non-
human animals is detrimental to humans as well as non-human animals. Aysha Akhtar, Fellow at 
the Oxford Center for Animal Ethics states, “The use of nonpredictive animal experiments can 
cause human suffering in at least two ways: (1) by producing misleading safety and efficacy data 
and (2) by causing potential abandonment of useful medical treatments and misdirecting 
resources away from more effective testing methods” (Akhtar, 414). Due to the unnatural 
variables scientist impose on non-human animals (manufactured diseases and environments) and 
differences in biological framework, other animals are an unpredictable source to develop 
lifesaving scientific ingenuity. Therefore, to argue that such experimentation provides an overall 
greater net pleasure (human gain) than net loss (animal suffering) is a large assumption as the net 
loss includes the humans within society who receive ineffective treatments, causing financial and 
physical pain, constructed from species with different biological processes.  
When Cohen claims that animal welfare advocates believe non-human animal research is 
wrong on the basis of net pain, he is misinformed. When faced with the question, “Would we be 
prepared to let thousands of humans die if they could be saved by a single experiment on a single 
animal?” (Singer, 81) Singer responds as follows: “If the experimenters would not be prepared to 
use a human infant then their readiness to use non-human animals reveals an unjustifiable form 
of discrimination on the basis of species” (82). According to Cohen’s logic, Singer should kill 
both the non-human animal and the infant as we have established that both are moral patients; 
however, just as speciesism would have us kill the non-human animal, Singer would not have us 
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kill the child or non-human animal. This is because Cohen’s speciest attitude has blinded him to 
the negative implications of his position. The animal welfare view would in this case appeal to 
rule utilitarianism. The rule in this instance would be to sacrifice thousands of non-human 
animals to possibly save one or more humans. However, as we established above, human 
suffering may arise from non-human animal experimentation. Therefore, the rule of killing 
several animals to possibly save one or more humans is both implausible and in the long run may 
increase the overall suffering of both humans and non-human animals.  
 
Part VI: Addressing Christine Korsgaard’s Challenge 
Through the analysis and interpretation of Immanuel Kant, Christine Korsgaard argues that non-
human animals are not rational beings, but instead are an obligation (in line with Cohens notion 
of obligation) to humanity, thus presenting a view contrary to Animal Welfare and Animal 
Rights advocates. According to Korsgaard the utilitarian or Animal Welfare approach is flawed 
as it permits an individual to be sacrificed against his or her will if the interests of many are 
served by the sacrifice (Korsgaard, 80). This contradicts Korsgaard’s deontological approach as 
it treats others as a mere means to an end, rather than an end in itself (80). This is because 
according to Kant’s Formula of Humanity, it is morally impermissible to deny human beings 
autonomy. This autonomy is nonexistent if humans are used as a mere means to an end. This is 
justified because of the distinct rational nature of humankind (80). This rational nature is 
characterized by a human’s capacity to govern themselves and utilize their autonomy for rational 
choice (80). To respect this autonomy, humanity must protect the autonomy of others by 
refraining from deception or coercion (81). This also involves the promotion of the ends of 
others when they require assistance; this leads to the Kantian idea of the “Kingdom of Ends” 
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(81). This can be illustrated in the form of a constitutional democracy, where humans have a 
legislative voice crafting moral laws (81). The utilitarian comparison between non-human 
animals on the one hand and infants, elderly persons, and the mentally disabled on the other are 
misguided (81). These particular conditions, according to Korsgaard or the Kantian conception, 
do not affect their standing as rational beings (81).  
Non-human animals are not rational beings as they do not possess the same level of 
moral reflection necessary to fulfill a moral duty; therefore, they should not be awarded the 
moral status requiring them to be an end in themselves. Non-human animals form a conception 
of environment (belief) and guide themselves in the environment (action) (83). It is the action 
that is essential to the Kantian perspective as it involves an incentive and a principle; however, 
an incentive is the factor that causes an agent to act (84). Principles and incentives are a pair. 
However, in a non-human animal these principles are mere instincts (84). Animals respond 
normatively to the incentive, rather than the incentive causing the animal to act (84). An 
intelligent animal is one who has the ability to learn from experience, forge new connections or 
principles, and increase responses (84). However, rationality and intelligence differ for Kant 
(84). Rationality allows one to develop their self-consciousness, enabling individuals to think 
about and perceive beliefs as grounds to act (85). Intelligent non-rational animals, however, may 
be moved to believe one thing when perceiving another rather than internalizing a belief causing 
an animal to act (85).  
According to Korsgaard making a causal connection between two things in the past is not 
equivalent to using one’s rationality as a tool, determining whether or not to act (85). Rather, 
rational human beings assess the principles that govern our beliefs and actions (86). This enables 
individuals to assess if their maxim can become universal law (87). For instance, human beings 
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can employ metacognition to determine why we take certain reasons as a cause for our action or 
inaction in a given situation. Non-human animals are unable to do this and, according to 
Korsgaard, cannot perceive their principles, inhibiting the moral reflection necessary for 
rationality and a place within the moral community (87).  
Kant categorizes non-human animals as beings that can be used as a mere means rather 
than an end in themselves (88). Humanity has the right to use animals for their ends but must 
refrain from torturing sentient beings, as it would only diminish the moral engagement between 
human beings (88). For instance, by torturing animals for no reason a moral agent may habituate 
action that goes against one’s moral duty to other humans within the moral community.  Our 
obligation toward non-human animals, according to Korsgaard’s view, is centered around the 
effect of humanity or the cultivating of duties. Therefore, no moral consideration is directly 
awarded to the non-human animal. According to Kant if humanity were to award animals 
consideration amphiboly would arise or the natural tendency to mistake an internal relation for 
an external one supposing we owe something to non-human animals (90). Humans only have 
duty toward other human beings (91). Non-human animals lack the capacity to obligate human 
beings, since they do not possess a legislative will that is a criterion of a rational being and one 
deserving of moral consideration under the Kantian lens (92). In response to the animal rights 
viewpoint, humanity’s autonomy puts individuals in a position to make demands for animal 
rights; however, this is not a sufficient reason for these rights to exist (100).  
 
Part VII: Response to Korsgaard’s Challenge 
When considering the Animal Rights defense, I will begin my assessment by arguing against 
Korsgaard’s claim that non-human animals are not rational and are thus underserving of rights. I 
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will do so by explaining the implications of two distinct senses of autonomy namely Kantian 
autonomy and preference autonomy. When considering Kantian autonomy or the autonomy 
awarded to those with a legislative will/moral reflection and the right to not be used as a mere 
means to an end, which is the foundation of rational choice, Tom Regan provides an alternative 
view from which animals possess full autonomy or preference autonomy (Regan 84-85). In the 
preference view individuals are considered autonomous “if they have preferences and have the 
ability to initiate action with a view to satisfying them” (84-85). Therefore, what Korsgaard 
considers “instincts” is insignificant to the preference view. An animal’s ability to initiate action 
from instinct does not require “one to be able to abstract from one’s own desires, goals, and so 
on, as a preliminary to asking what any other similarity placed individual ought to do.” (84-85). 
This form of meta-cognition is not necessary to possess preference autonomy. The existence of 
the Kantian sense of autonomy cannot deny a non-human animal from possessing preference 
autonomy; thus, non-human animals possess a level of rationality (84-48). An example of 
preference autonomy would be if you presented your pet dog, we will call him “Dexter”, the 
option of going outside during his 3:00pm feeding time or staying indoors to eat. Depending on 
Dexter’s choice he will demonstrate a preference for eating or running outside and thus will act 
in accordance to this decision, thus exhibiting behavior in line with preference autonomy (85).  
Preference autonomy allows for a level of rationality that should be accepted as sufficient 
grounds to be members of the moral community. However, Korsgaard, using Kant’s view on 
indirect duty, positions what we owe to non-human animals as a secondary condition from which 
humans are able to fulfill their direct duty to other human beings (150). According to this a moral 
community only consists of those who are of direct moral concern or humanity. However, if this 
view were to be adopted we would remain in the cave of speciesism and continue to believe 
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shadows are real. Therefore animals, human and non-human, who lack the Kantian self-
legislating will, must be categorized as moral patients. Moral patients are those who “cannot do 
what is right, nor can they do what is wrong. Only moral agents can do wrong. Human infants, 
young children, and mentally deranged or feeble of all ages are cases of human moral patients” 
(153). Similar to moral agents, moral patients can be on the receiving end of right or wrong acts 
of moral agents (154). According to Korsgaard if moral agents perform wrong actions against 
moral patients, a habit of cruelty is developed that is a detriment to the moral community. 
According to Regan, there is a resemblance between how a moral agent and moral patient react 
to wrong action; namely the suffering that is initiated causes anguish (Regan, 183). This similar 
suffering response thus prompts the question: “if the suffering is similar, and if causing it in the 
case of moral agents violates a direct duty owed to them, (as Kant allows), then how can we non-
arbitrarily avoid the conclusion that causing suffering to human moral patients violates a direct 
duty owed to them?” (183).   
According to Regan, if moral agents have a direct duty not to cause other human beings 
to suffer, then the same must be applied to human and non-human animal moral patients. 
However, Korsgaard may dispute this claim as a misinterpretation. In response, Regan would 
bring to light Kant’s inconsistency. If human moral patients are deserving of direct duties as 
ends, so are non-human animals as we have established that they are not obligations, but rather 
individuals deserving of moral patienthood (Regan, 184). To exclude non-human animals would 
be speciest and thus would promote immoral action as a moral agent would be neglecting his or 
her duty to moral patients, “taking the form of declaring that no animal is a member of the moral 
community because no animal belongs to the right species-namely, Homo sapiens” (156). If we 
are to recognize the role of moral patienthood, non-human animals must be included – and with 
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that comes a direct duty moral agents owe all members of a moral community: namely the claim 
or right to respectful treatment as an individual with inherent value (276).  This inherent value 
stems from the rationality given to non-human animals who express preference autonomy and 
thus have capacities deserving of moral patienthood.  
 
Part VIII: Conclusion 
When confronted by both Kristine Korsgaard and Carl Cohen’s view on non-human animals as a 
mere obligation it is clear both are derivatives of speciesism. As we have established, non-human 
animals are rational beings deserving of equal consideration and/or inherent rights. With such 
rationality, awarded by preference autonomy, non-human animals deserve the status of moral 
patienthood and thus are members of the moral community. As rightful members of the moral 
community, non-human animals must be protected by moral agents who can ensure no needless 
suffering is placed upon them by human beings in violation of moral responsibilities. Since 
speciesism results in this violation of moral responsibility, each of us including myself must 
continue to question practices that involve non-human animals and consider how we can grow 
toward moral agents who effectively fulfill our duty to the moral community. Through further 
research philosophers can reinforce and define the role of patienthood amongst human and non-
human animals, allowing each member to thrive within the moral community. We must look past 
the cave and toward the sun. Our speciest attitudes blindside our moral responsibility, but 
through continual questioning we each can take a step toward a brighter future for all members 
of our diverse community human or non-human alike. 
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Section III – Impact of Framing Intervention Model on Animal 
Attitudes, Animal Rights, and Human Social Outgroups 
 
“Once one has seen it {the Good} …one must infer that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything…it 
controls and provides truth and understanding; and that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it 
(Republic, 517c).” 
 
Part I: Introduction 
In Plato’s allegory of the cave, we all are imprisoned by ignorance; it is not until we open 
ourselves to diverse perspectives that we can see the Good or kindness, respect, and truth. In 
order to “act sensibly” in contemporary society, humanity must pursue the Good, by rejecting 
divisions in society that propagate ignorance such as racism, sexism, homophobia and other 
prejudices. This journey toward the Good begins by acknowledging the biases we have and 
discontinuing the unjust action associated with such prejudice. Speciesism, or the prejudicial 
attitude toward non-human animals based on mere species membership, is correlated with these 
forms of bigotry such as racism, sexism, and homophobia, fostering a society that can deviate 
from the Good (Caviola, Everett, & Faber, 2-3). The present research is designed to investigate 
the impact of an intervention aimed at reducing speciesism on biases against both non-human 
animals and humans. Speciesism is the normative claim that humans assign moral values to 
individuals based on mere species membership (1). This may be illustrated by finding the 
suffering of the non-human animal (a horse) as morally acceptable, while the same degree of 
suffering would be immoral to a human baby.  
Speciesism is positively associated with the Social Dominance Orientation (SOD) and 
negatively associated with open-minded thinking and empathic concern (2-3). The Social 
Dominance Human-Animal Relation Model (SD-HARM) describes how the social ideological 
  28 
 
beliefs that legitimize hierarchies among human groups also legitimize hierarchies of humans 
over non-human animals (3). An important piece of these hierarchies relates to whom moral 
concern should be applied. Moral concern is intervening when an individual suffers from actions 
rooted in prejudicial attitudes. For instance, intervening when a white supremacist discriminates 
against people of color or intervening when an individual subjects a non-human animal rabbit to 
harmful scientific research that would otherwise be condemned if performed on a human. Moral 
concern is important because it reduces and/or eliminates harmful actions stemming from 
prejudicial attitudes. Speciesism’s positive association with (SOD) lowers the moral concern one 
may have for social outgroups (3). By an individual believing humans are superior to animals the 
belief that some humans are superior over other humans is legitimized (3).  
To combat speciest attitudes a study conducted by Brock Bastian, Kimberly Costello, Steve 
Loughnan, and Gordon Hodson, found that comparing humans to non-human animals reduces 
moral concern for animals but comparing animals to humans does the reverse (Bastian et al, 
422). This is because comparing non-human animals to humans highlights the morally relevant 
capacities of non-human animals such as sense related capacities that are associated with the 
ability to suffer, whereas comparing to humans to non-human animals diminishes these morally 
relevant capacities (422). The impact of comparing non-human animals to humans (or vice-
versa) on moral concern for non-human animals was demonstrated in Study 3 (Bastian et al.) by 
participants writing about either what makes animals similar to humans, what makes humans 
similar to animals, or what makes telephones similar to computers. Afterwards, a moral circle 
measure was completed indicating the animals the participant felt morally obligated to show 
concern for, followed by a measure of speciesism consisting of 10 questions from the Animal 
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Rights Scale and 10 items from the Animal Attitudes Scale, and a measure of moral concern 
determining the likelihood of taking a moral stand for a social outgroup.     
 However, it is important to replicate the afore-described study before deploying the 
essay-writing intervention in schools and organizations because the sample size is too small. Any 
estimate of effect size is imprecise when the sample is small. A p-value only tells us whether an 
effect exists, not how large it is. It is possible that the afore-described effect is too tiny to 
meaningfully reduce bias. According to g*power statistical analysis software, a sample size of 
218 provides enough power to detect effects at least as large as d = .46 which is considered small 
in psychology. A sample size of 109 only provides enough statistical power to detect effects at 
least as large as d = .63 which is considered medium in psychology. We predict that a replication 
of the essay-writing intervention with a larger sample size will demonstrate that a large effect 
exists that can reduce speciesism.   
 
Part II: Overview of Study 
The present research replicated Study 3 in the paper, When Closing the Human-Animal Divide 
Expands Moral Concern: The Importance of Framing, using animal to human framing to 
increase moral concern for animals and social outgroups with a larger sample (Bastian et al.). We 
hypothesized that “Animal to Human” framing compared to “Human to Animal” and control 
framing would increase moral concern for animals and social outgroups. We also predicted that 
an “Animal to Human” framing would increase positive attitudes toward animal rights, animals, 
and social outgroups. Replication was done in an effort to evaluate whether an increased sample 
size would have an overall effect on the power of framing results.   
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Part III: Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants will be both male and female, ages ranging from 18-24. Participants were 
undergraduate students at the University of North Florida who participated for course credit. 
Participants will be randomly assigned to one of three conditions (Animal is Human like 
framing, Human is Animal like framing, Control) in a between-groups design. After removing 
both Vegan/Vegetarians and those that spent less than 200 seconds on the study, the total amount 
of participants went from 244 to 193.  
Procedure 
Participants were informed that they would be participating in a study designed to learn about 
people’s social impressions, in particular, what they think about animals. However, the true 
purpose of this study is to determine if an “animals-are-human-like” framing compared to a 
“humans-are-animal-like” framing attributes greater moral worth to animals. Participants were 
also told that this study’s benefit will help the researchers learn about social impressions, in 
particular, what people think about animals; however, the true benefit is to determine if an 
“animals-are-human-like” framing compared to a “humans-are-animal-like” framing is an 
effective intervention model to reduce speciesism. The first task, serving as the independent 
variable, was an essay prompt. The participant is presented with one essay prompt out of the 
following three: “What makes animals similar to humans?”, “What makes humans similar to 
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Manipulation Check 
After completing one of the randomized essays serving as the independent variable participants 
were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt animals are similar to humans (1= very much 
dissimilar to 7= very much similar).  
Moral Circle Measure 
To determine the number of animals in a participants moral circle they were asked to “indicate 
those animals that you feel morally obligated to show concern for.” Participants were presented 
with a list of 26 common non-human animals.  
Animal Rights.  
In order to measure moral concern for animals, participants completed the Animal Rights Scale. 
Questions included declarative statements that indicated if an individual attributed moral concern 
for animals. (e.g. Humans have no right to displace wild animals by converting wilderness areas 
into farmlands, cities, and other things designed for people.) The scale ranged from 1-Strongly 
disagree to 7-Strongly agree.   
Animal Attitudes 
 In order to measure attitudes toward animal welfare generally, participants completed the 
Animal Attitude Scale. Questions included declarative statements that indicated the level to 
which a participant agreed or disagreed toward a statement indicating animal welfare attitudes 
(e.g. Basically, humans have the right to use animals as we see fit.) The scale ranged from 1 
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Outgroup Moral Concern 
In order to measure moral concern to social outgroups, participants completed a scale consisting 
of six social outgroups (Black people, Asians, Muslims, Aboriginals, Immigrants). The question 
indicates the participants likelihood of intervening or taking a moral stand on behalf of members 
of the social outgroups if “treated unfairly or badly” The scale ranged from (0=not intervene, 
50=neutral, 100= definitely intervene) 
Evaluation Thermometers  
In order to measure how favorably participants felt toward social groups, participants completed 
a scale consisting of 11 social groups (Whites, Black people, East Asians, South Asians, 
Americans, Canadians, Mexicans, Europeans, Liberals, Conservatives, Animals). The question 
indicates how favorable do participants feel toward each social group. The scale ranged from 
(0=not favorable at all, 50=neither favorable or unfavorable, 100= extremely favorable) 
Ascent of Humans  
In order to measure how human like a social group seems, participants completed a Human 
Ascent scale consisting of six social groups (White People, Black People, Americans, Canadians, 
and Animals). The question indicates that people can vary in how human-like they seem. Some 
people may seem highly evolved whereas others may seem no different than lower evolved 
beings. Using an image of the evolution of man participants indicate using the sliders on a scale 
of 0 to 100 how evolved he or she may consider the average member of each group to be.          
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Part IV: Results 
Animal Dependent Variables were measured in an attempt to determine whether or not the 
independent variables would have an effect on a person attributing moral concern for non-human 
animals.  
Manipulation Check 
To investigate the impact of the essay participants wrote on how similar are animals to humans, I 
conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as in the independent variable and similarity 
of animals to humans (manipulation check) as the dependent variable. The type of essay did not 
have a significant effect on support for animal rights, F (2, 191) = 1.33, p = .270. 
Moral Circle 
To investigate the impact of the essay participants wrote on the number of animals included in a 
person’s moral circle, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as in the independent 
variable and number of animals in moral circle as the dependent variable. The type of essay did 
not have a significant effect on expansion of one’s moral circle., F (2, 185) = 1.57, p = .210. 
Animal Rights.  
To investigate the impact of the essay participants wrote on support for animal rights, I 
conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as in the independent variable and support 
for animal rights scale as the dependent variable. The type of essay did not have a significant 
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Animal Attitudes 
To investigate the impact of the essay participants wrote on attitudes toward animals, I 
conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as in the independent variable and animal 
attitudes as the dependent variable. The type of essay did not have a significant effect on animal 
attitudes, F (2, 191) = 2.07, p = .130. 
Human Dependent Variables were measured in an attempt to determine whether or not the 
independent variables would have an effect on a person attributing moral concern for non-human 
animals.  
Moral Concern all Outgroups, all Members of Outgroups Excluded. 
I conducted a one-way ANOVA with essay type as the independent variable and measures of 
moral concern to all outgroups as the dependent variable. The type of essays did have a marginal 
effect on the way participants viewed human outgroups, F (2, 191) = 2.16, p = .080. A t-test 
demonstrated that participants who wrote about how similar animals are to humans (M = 85.96) 
had more moral concern for all human outgroups compared to participants who wrote about how 
similar humans are to animals, M = 79.99, t(127.11) = 1.73, p = .043. However, participants who 
wrote about how similar animals are to humans (M = 85.96) and how similar telephones are to 
computers (M = 86.81) did not differ in their moral concern for all human outgroups, t(118.33) = 
-0.26, p = .602. 
Feeling Thermometers, No Outgroup Participants 
To investigate the impact of the essay participants completed on attitudes toward social 
outgroups, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as the independent variable and 
feeling thermometer scores as the dependent variable. The type of essay did not have a 
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significant effect on feeling thermometers, F (2, 123) = 1.51, p = .230. Notably, participants who 
were members of the target outgroups were excluded from this analysis. 
Ascent of Humans: Black people, Black Participants Excluded  
To investigate the impact of the essay participants performed a how evolved participants believe 
Black people are, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as in the independent 
variable and the how evolved participants believe Black people are as the dependent variable. 
The type of essay did have a significant effect on viewing Black people as more evolved when 
excluding Black participants in test, F (2, 160) = 3.23, p = 040. A t-test demonstrated that 
participants who wrote about how similar animals are to humans (M = 91.76) and how similar 
humans are to animals (M =90.46) did not differ in how evolved they viewed Black people, 
t(126.73) = .4473, p = .327. However, participants who wrote about how similar animals are to 
humans (M = 91.76) viewed Black people as more evolved compared to participants who wrote 
about how similar telephones are to computers, M = 96.20, t(89.98) = -2.0493, p = .021. 
 
Part V: Discussion  
The results suggest that with a slightly larger sample size the effect of the framing model was not 
significant. Therefore, “Animal to Human” framing is not a viable intervention model to 
implement in schools or for a universal population in an effort to increase moral concern for  
non-human animals. There were inconsistences between this study and the original that may 
have resulted in a different pattern of results. The first being with the demographics: student 
participants in our study were from the United States whereas students in the original study were 
from Canada. The variance in culture may have affected the way participants understood the 
framing model, resulting in different p values amongst dependent variables.  
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The second inconsistency was using a different operationalization of speciesism. The 
original study used 10 questions from the Animal Rights Scale and 10 questions from the Animal 
Attitude Scale, but we used the complete version of each scale. We did this because the original 
study did not specify the questions used and we wanted to measure each scale as a separate 
dependent variable.  
Notably, the effect of the framing model on moral concern for social outgroups was 
significant in the original study and marginal in the current replication. The present study also 
added on two additional dependent variables evaluating the effect of “Animal to Human” 
framing on social outgroups. The additional variables are as follows: an additional feeling 
thermometer evaluating how favorable a participant feels toward a variety of social outgroups, as 
well as the human ascent scale measuring how evolved participants view select social outgroups. 
The impact of the intervention was marginal on these new variables.  
It was also consistent that in both studies the “Animal to Human” framing did not differ 
significantly from the control condition when evaluating moral concern. With the addition of the 
Human Ascent scale we also discovered a marginal p value suggesting that when participants 
completed the “Animal to Human” framing they viewed black people as more evolved. 
The implications of the present study suggest there are some marginal effects of the 
framing model on social outgroups; however, with the primary goal of increasing moral concern 
for non-human animals the framing model would need to be the subject of more scientific 
research. As animal ethics is a relatively new topic in both psychology and philosophy the 
present research provides another interpretation of an intervention model with the aim at 
increasing moral concern to non-human animals, as well as expands on existing studies in this 
field. With further research the effects of the present “Animal to Human” framing can be shown 
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as more significant or a new intervention model can be tested that may prove more effective for 
increasing participants moral concern toward non-human animals, while reducing speciest 
attitudes that diminish the moral concern individuals have toward non-human animals. By 
continuing to question present research and expanding on the field we can dispel the ignorance 
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